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3MAIN CONCLUSIONS
1.  First problems have emerged in the process of negotiations on Poland’s
accession to the European Union. Due to a lack of clearly defined goals
in the Polish negotiating mandate, there is a threat that Poland will be
pushed into the second category of countries aspiring to the EU
membership.
2.  This situation is accompanied by the currently growing syndrome of
tiredness with Europe among the citizens of the EU member states. The
signs of that tiredness include the tendency to close within local
communities and to turn away from universal European ideas, as a result
of fears of the tough criteria related to the euro, as well as the reluctance
to make sacrifices on behalf of the countries aspiring to join the Union.
3.  The acceleration of the integration has overheated the process. In the
economy, overheating implies a need to slow down economic growth. A
similar situation has been observed in the case of integration processes
in the EU. The overheating of the integration process is reflected by the
real slowing down of its momentum. The main barrier preventing a
further progress of integration, apart from the declining support by EU
citizens, is an increasing differentiation of political interests among the
member states.
4.  The social attitudes related to the introduction of the common currency
are accompanied by a fear of the Union’s enlargement to include
Central Eastern European countries. It should be expected that, together
with the advance of negotiations on their accession, the fears may grow
and take various forms.
5.  The common currency, the system of closer co-operation, will facilitate
the implementation and enlargement of the European Union. However,
the introduction of the common currency will, at the same time, mean
the establishment of a solid nucleus of the Union. This will enable the
enlargement of the EU to include new members, while placing them in
the European area. Under these circumstances, integration may advance
among the current member states of the Union, leaving other countries
in the margin of the process.
6.  The strategic goals of the negotiating mandate should be:
4 negotiating realistic, optimum and effective transition periods for
Poland, which would be based on accurate economic
calculations. Unjustified extension of the transition periods would
be a historic neglect and short-sighted ignorance;
 joining the EU as part of the first enlargement wave (along with
the Czech Republic and Hungary). The belief that it is not
possible for the Czech Republic or Hungary to join the Union
earlier than Poland liners on among the Polish public, but also
among some of the political circles in Poland. Meanwhile, if
Poland makes mistakes, it may be joining the EU in the second
turn;
 making a better use of Poland’s geographical situation to achieve
political and economic goals, although there is no doubt that
Poland will be very isolated in promoting its eastern neighbours;
 by restricting the negotiations exclusively to the issues concerning
the Single Market, Poland would simultaneously agree to be
pushed off to the outskirts of the European economic area.
5I. Analysis of the situation
The process of European integration is not a stable one. It has its
ups and downs. Nonetheless, over the past fifty years, it has been
progressing on the whole. In the 1990s, real grounds emerged for the first
time for a qualitative change of the integration processes and their
permanent transformation. A fast acceleration was observed. At the
internal level, the acceleration of the integration process was reflected by
the establishment of the European Union (1992), intensive efforts aimed at
introducing the common currency euro, the Inter-Government Conference
held in 1996-1997, and the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. In the
external dimension, the acceleration was reflected by the political consent
to the accession of Central Eastern European countries to the EU
expressed in June 1993, the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to
the EU (January 1995), and the selection of six countries to be invited to
hold EU membership negotiations (December 1997). From the historical
perspective, this acceleration of integration is unmatched in the nearly
fifty-years long history of the Communities.
It should be noted that when the agreement establishing Poland’s
association with the European Communities was being initialled in
Brussels on 16 December 1991, none of the participants of the ceremony
expected that Poland could start membership negotiations within barely
seven years.
Back then, it was very difficult for the political circles in the
Communities to accept the idea of Poland’s future membership in the
Union. It was a personal achievement of Jan Kułakowski, at the time the
Polish ambassador to the Communities, that the unilateral declaration
stating that Poland’s ultimate goal was the membership of the Community,
was forced through in the preamble of the agreement. In 1991-1992, a
broad discussion was going on in Brussels on deepening the Community.
During that discussion, the possibility of a simultaneous widening was
basically rejected as contradictory to the deepening efforts. The question
was whether to deepen or to widen the Community. The heated
atmosphere of those deliberations was certainly connected with the
immense political changes occurring in Europe and in the world. These
changes, initiated by the Round Table Talks in Poland in 1989, and
followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany,
made the Union’s politicians realise the need for a faster political
integration. For the first time, thanks to Germany’s unification, the Union
expanded geographically not as a result of accession talks, but due to an
enlargement of the territory of one of the member states. In March 1990,
Belgium put forward a proposal to hold an inter-government conference on
the political union and institution reinforcement. The proposal was backed
6by Germany and France. As a result, it was decided (Dublin I and Dublin
II) that two parallel inter-government conferences would be held: on the
Economic and Monetary Union, and on the Political Union. The
extraordinary summit which convened in Dublin on 28 April 1990, was
initially meant to be devoted exclusively to the unification of Germany.
Right before the meeting, the leaders of France and Germany addressed a
joint letter to their ten colleagues, proposing to deepen the political
integration within the Communities. They suggested four main topics for
the future negotiations: a greater “democratisation” of the Communities, an
enhancement of efficiency of EC institutions, ensuring policy uniformity
and coherence in the economic, monetary and political activities, as well
as defining and implementing a common foreign and security policy. The
discussion of the French-German proposal dominated the summit,
departing from the issue of Germany’s unification, which was the main
reason why the conference had been convened in the first place.
Britain was the most negative towards the proposed political union.
Margaret Thatcher held the opinion that the proposal may be interpreted
by the British people as meant to transform the Communities into a single
state. “Will it be necessary to explain to the citizens what the political
union is not going to be by eliminating its competence, or will it be
necessary to tell them that the European Union is not going to hurt either
their beloved Queen, or the Parliament which has already been working in
the Westminster for seven centuries,” she said (quoted after L’Agence
Europe, 29 April 1990) [retranslated]. A similarly reserved attitude
towards the French-German initiative was held by the Portuguese and the
Danes. The inter-government conferences started in Rome in December
1990. The places where the negotiations were held changed in the course
of the conferences. Finally, the treaty was signed by all the member states
in Maastricht on 7 February 1992.
After the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the European Union
established, the process of European integration definitely gained
momentum. The question whether the Union should be deepened or
widened was replaced by the concept of implementing the two processes
in parallel.
The rapid acceleration has led to an overheating of the
integration process. In the economy, overheating implies a need to
slow down economic growth. A similar situation has been observed in
the case of integration processes in the EU. The main barrier
preventing a further progress of integration is a declining support by
EU citizens, coupled by an increasing differentiation of political
interests among the member states.. The overheating of the
7integration process is reflected by the real slowing down of its
momentum. That fact is not quite generally realised, but the tendency
is taking a real shape in the form of the trend to abandon gradually
the deepening of integration for the sake of its flattening.
The main reasons underlying the qualitative changes in the EU
integration process are:
1.  A fall in the public’s approval for a further deepening of integration.
2.  The decision to enlarge the Union.
The ways in which these changes are occurring include:
• The possibility for a member state not to participate in a specific type of
co-operation within the Community following an autonomous decision
by the member state;
• The possibility to exclude a member state from a specific type of co-
operation on the basis of a decision by the Council of Ministers of the
European Union;
• The introduction of the principle of flexibility in the Amsterdam Treaty.
1.  Fall in public support for a further deepening of integration
Latest opinion polls conducted among the European Union’s
citizens show that 43% of the EU population support Poland’s accession
to the Union. The most sceptical attitudes were held by Germans (29%
support). Reluctance towards a fast enlargement was also observed among
Austrians, Danes and Belgians. That decline in the integration zeal is
connected with a generally declining public support in the member states
for the idea of deepening the Union. According to figures released by
Eurobarometer, the confidence in the European Union has fallen by over
20 percentage points since 1990 (from 72% in 1990 to 48 percent in
1996).
To date, the integration processes within the Community have been
based on the building of the Single Market. The stages of the integration
were: the free trade zone, the customs union, and the Single Market. At the
moment, the last stage of the process, namely, the monetary union is being
implemented. Thus, the implementation of the idea of economic integration
will be fully completed. The common policy will be pursued in all the main
areas of the economy, and the decisions will be made by supra-national
organisations. The economy, and not politics, has been the dominating
factor in the establishment of a united Europe. However any community
formed on economic grounds alone is always insufficient. The 1990s
8have demonstrated the weakness of the Community. Faced with the war in
former Yugoslavia, the Union has proved helpless in the military or
diplomatic sense. The political integration and unity necessary to settle the
conflict were lacking.
The 1990s have seen the gap widen between economic integration
and democracy in the broad meaning of the term. The progress in
economic integration has highlighted the shortcomings in democracy (for
example, the free flow of people makes it necessary to ensure equal
treatment to all and to ban discrimination). Therefore, it should not be
considered surprising that a EU citizen manifests his or her European
identity mainly by referring to the economic success, a growing prosperity.
As a consequence, it should not be surprising either that, during the times
of recession, all polls record a dramatic decline in trust in the Union’s
institutions and in the integration idea. The interdependence between the
economic cycle and support for Europe is very well reflected in the
statistics kept by Eurobarometer. During the period 1987-1992, the
average annual rate of economic growth in Europe was 4%, which created
9 million new jobs. The boom ended in 1992, bringing a fall in the public’s
trust in the Union. In 1991, support was expressed by 72% respondents,
but the figure fell to 48% over the next five years. Despite the great impact
of economic integration on the development of European unity, economic
ties have turned out too week to provide the grounds for the future of
Europe. The period when Europe could develop without an active
involvement of its citizens, with their silent consent, is history now.
The end of the 1990s marks a revival of the idea that Europe means
mainly the implementation of universal democracy with a top priority
given to the human person. The future of the Union and its further
development depend on the degree in which the Union’s citizens and
nations identify themselves with the organisation. It should be expected
that future treaty provisions will focus on issues concerning the European
citizenship, growing powers of the European Parliament, or more
generally, the development of democracy. Already in the Amsterdam
Treaty, the most elaborate part of the document is the section entitled “The
Union and Citizens,” and the titles of its chapters: employment, social
policy, environment, public health, and consumer protection, indicate the
increasing attention paid to the human and moral aspects of the integration
process.
One may say that, if today, the European politicians do not quite
agree yet as to the finalité politique of the united Europe, they certainly
agree on the importance of the European identity of its citizens as the core
from which the integration idea should stem in the coming decades.
9 Among the citizens of the member states, there is a growing
syndrome of tiredness with Europe at the moment. The signs of that
tiredness include the tendency to close within local communities, to turn
away from universal European ideas, a reluctance to make sacrifices on
behalf of the countries aspiring to the EU membership, and most of all, a
fear of the tough euro criteria. The French government realised the
magnitude of those fears quite dramatically when the country was hit by a
wave of strikes and demonstrations against attempts to reduce the level of
social security ensured by the state. The citizens’ growing alienation from
the Union is additionally due to the fact that all the major structural
reforms are implemented by the EU executive authorities, without the
involvement of the national parliaments and the European Parliament. The
participation of representative institutions is restricted to pronouncing
opinions for or against. The parliaments are faced with accomplished facts,
and do not take part in material discussions and negotiations. Thus, the
executive and legislative branches of the government are swapping their
traditional functions. The increasing scope of issues regulated by the
Council and the Commission, and their direct interference with the rights
and duties of the citizens, formerly reserved exclusively to the national
regulations, must provoke concern. Furthermore, these tendencies are
certainly one of the reasons underlying the growing hostility among the
people towards the idea of a strongly united Europe.
First signs of a growing civil resistance against a further deepening
of the integration showed in the results of the referenda held on the
Maastricht Treaties in France and Denmark. Our analysis must not ignore
either that Norwegians did not agree to join the EU, that Malta’s decided
to abandon accession talks, and that a reluctance has been showed by a
majority of the people in Switzerland.
The social attitudes connected with the introduction of the common
currency are coupled by the fear of the Union’s enlargement to include the
countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEECs). It should be expected that,
together with the advance of their membership negotiations, that fear may
increase and take various forms. The enlargement to include the CEECs
will be the first enlargement not only in the quantitative, but also in the
qualitative sense in the history of the Communities. The countries
comprised in the Communities, and those which later joined the European
Union never differed in the economic, cultural and political sense. This
also applies to the countries which experienced periods of dictatorship in
their history, e.g., Spain or Greece. They did not give up the rules of a
market economy. They were sovereign states, preserving a centuries-long
tradition of the western civilisation. Poland, similar to other countries
neighbouring with the EU (with the exception of the Czech Republic and
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Hungary), is not perceived as a Western European country. There is a
mentality gap between us and the EU member states. Therefore, one
should not be surprised with various proposals which are being put
forward to place us in the European area as second or even third class
members. French politicians are particularly prone to do that. In this
context, let us quote Claude Cheysonn, former minister for European
integration and ex-member of the European Commission, who said, “The
Union’s enlargement would be advantageous in the case of democratic
countries with high living standards and advanced social structures.
Germans, whose eyes are turned to the East, care about the enlargement.
However, their accession (the accession of CEECs) will prevent any new
policy. Britain is delighted to see its wishes come true: a huge European
free trade zone and nothing more. So, this is what the future of the Union
looks like. While comprising a growing territory, the Union will, at the
same time, be stripped of ambition and all democratic control. Some might
be tempted to describe that using different words, as a fat, sterilised
Europe incapable of taking action. This is not the kind of Europe we
need.” Giscard d’Estaing had similar reservations. He suggested to place
the countries aspiring to EU membership in an external ring of the Union,
restricting their membership to the free trade zone alone, due to their lack
of cultural and historical unity with the West.
Both statements were published in the serious, high-circulation
French press (Le Monde and Le Figaro). It should be expected that the
number of such statements will be growing together with the advance of
the accession talks. It is going to be very difficult to change the well
established stereotypes and the traditional image of the CEECs and their
citizens held by the average western voters.
There is a strong fear that the introduction of the euro will amplify
the problem of a growing unemployment. A half of unemployed in the EU
have been jobless for over a year, and one in five unemployed is under
twenty-five years of age. The growing unemployment encourages the
emergence of an unfavourable political atmosphere around the EU
enlargement. EU citizens fear an inflow of cheaper labour from the East.
They also fear losing the feeling of security, an inflow of organised crime,
or, in more general terms, a withering of the social structure due to non-
legalistic attitudes of their new co-citizens.
2.  Decision on EU enlargement
By a paradox, the turning moment from which the first signs of
overheating of the integration process were observed, was the signing of
the Maastricht Treaty. This is a paradox because that moment has been
perceived as a great success of another stage of deepening the
11
Communities, i.e., the establishment of the European Union. For the first
time, a treaty was adopted that laid foundations for the development of a
common foreign and security policy, as well as the common judiciary and
law enforcement systems. On the day when the Treaty was signed, it was
forgotten that the costs involved had been high. These costs included
consent to Britain’s opting-out on the social protocol, its exclusion from
participation in the financial costs related to the enforcement of the basic
rights stipulated in the employees charter dated 1989, and the special
status of Denmark. Denmark does not have to participate in the single
currency, and it does not take part as a full member of the Western
European Union. It was forgotten that the Treaty and the negotiations
which preceded its signing, unveiled the growing contradictions
between the member states, and the increasing role of their particular
interests. The compromise achieved at the cost of Britain’s opting-out,
additional decisions, protocols, and declarations providing for the
special status of Denmark, in fact, started the implementation of a
highly disintegrating idea of Europe á la carte. The idea that enables a
member state to make an independent decision not to take part in
specific activities undertaken by the Union. The fact that Britain’s new
Labour prime minister endorsed the social protocol can be no excuse. The
point is the very establishment of the mechanism allowing free choice.
The possibility for a member state not to participate in specific types
of co-operation on the basis of a free decision of the member state was
reaffirmed in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty was not a full
compromise despite its ignoring the most sensitive institutional issues.
Special protocols supplementing the document recognised the right of
Britain, Ireland and Denmark not to participate in the Council’s work
related to specific matters. Britain and Ireland maintained their right to
check persons crossing their borders within the Community. Despite the
adoption of the entire Schengen agreement into the acquis communautaire,
the relevant provisions will not concern Britain and Ireland which have not
signed the agreement to date. The Amsterdam Treaty sealed the principle
enabling individual member states not to take part in certain areas of co-
operation. In other words, it confirmed the idea of integration á la carte.
From the legal point of view, the Maastricht Treaty for the first
time created a mechanism that allowed to exclude individual member
states from co-operation in certain domains of the Union. As it is
known, this May, the Council is to decide which countries will be allowed
to participate in the monetary union. The countries which do not fulfil
certain criteria are described as member states with derogation (Art. 109k
of the European Communities Treaty). Thus, there will be an automatic
division into two groups: the countries fully co-operating with each other,
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and those excluded from the co-operation. The day of accession to the
monetary union, even if only one single country is left outside the euro
area, will be the beginning of Europe divided into the better and the worse
members. The Union will start entering a stage of Euro-zones. There will
be the first, second, third, and maybe even the fourth ring of states,
depending on their position with regard to the nucleus formed by the
participants of the monetary union. The placement of countries in the rings
will vary. The countries will be able to pass from one ring to another,
depending on their economic performance.
The Inter-Government Conference of the member states of the
European Union concluded its work in Amsterdam on 17 July 1997. The
new treaty described as the Amsterdam Treaty was initialled. For Poland
and other associated countries, the most important achievement of the
Treaty was that the fact it was passed. In line with the decision made by
the Council of Europe in Madrid, the adoption of the Treaty opened the
way for the associated countries to begin membership negotiations with
the EU. The Treaty was officially signed by the foreign ministers of the
fifteen member states in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997.
The Treaty will take effect after it is ratified by all the member
states and by the European Parliament. It should be expected that the
ratification process may take up to two years. In many member states, due
to their constitutional tradition, the ratification will be preceded by
referenda. This is the case with countries such as: Denmark, France, the
Scandinavian countries, and Austria. Various problems should be expected
bearing in mind the bad experience related to the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty.
It appears that a possible negative result of individual referenda will
not be connected directly with a critical assessment of the new treaty.
Compared to the Maastricht Treaty, the provisions adopted in the
Amsterdam Treaty are to a much greater extent transparent and oriented
towards increasing the freedoms and the feeling of security of the citizens.
The ratification process will be coinciding with such important events as
the selection for the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union
(April-May 1998) and parliamentary elections in Germany (September
1998). These factors, and most of all, the social threats felt in connection
with the introduction of the common currency, may stimulate a wave of
Euro-scepticism in the Union. It would also be difficult to ignore the
feeling of “tiredness with Europe,” the tendency to turn away from
politics, from the universal ideas, the tendency to close within local
communities, and the growing nationalist trends observed among the
people in the member states.
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A new element in the Amsterdam Treaty was the institution of a
closer co-operation (co-operation plus etroite). When certain member
states will want to establish closer co-operation in certain areas, they will
be able to take advantage of the Union’s institutions, procedures and
mechanisms provided for in the treaties. The establishment of closer co-
operation should be aimed at enhancing the fulfilment of the Union’s tasks,
while fully respecting the treaties and the Community’s uniform
institutional framework.
That co-operation is to be a final resort, and the decision concerning
its establishment must be pegged to the participation of the majority of the
member states. The costs of co-operation, with the exception of
administrative costs, are to be covered by the countries involved.
The Amsterdam Treaty was to prepare the EU for the enlargement
to include the CEECs. As it is known, the negotiations on the institutional
reform of the EU were given up. The reform is to be discussed as part of a
new treaty, no later than a year before the accession of the twenty-first
member state to the Union. However, this does not mean that the Treaty
completely neglected the issues related to the future enlargement.
Nevertheless, the point is that the Union has adopted a negative
approach when preparing for the enlargement. Thus, for the first
time in the history of the Communities, it was provided for the
possibility to use sanctions against a member state violating the
fundamental civil rights and liberties (new Art. F.a and Art. 236 of
the European Communities Treaty). The relevant provision stipulates
that “The Council, convened at the level of heads of state or government,
by the power of a unanimous decision, following a motion filed by one
third of the member states or by the Commission, having considered the
opinion of the European Parliament, may state the existence of a
permanent and serious violation (l’existence d’une violation grave et
persistante) of the principles laid out in Art. F, section 1, by one of the
member states. The Council must earlier request the government of a given
member state to present all its observations on the matter” [retranslated].
Having endorsed such a motion, by a qualified majority of votes, the
Council may suspend a member state in certain rights related to the
implementation of the Treaty, including the right to vote enjoyed by the
country’s representative on the Council.
It is natural that the reason underlying the adoption of the
above provision was bad experience related to respect for human
rights in certain countries aspiring to the EU membership, e.g.,
regarding the treatment of national minorities. This also applies to the
declaration stating that the capital punishment has been abolished by
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the majority of the member states, and is not administered anywhere
nowadays.
The observance of the fundamental human rights and civil liberties
is a precondition for a country to be admitted to join the Union (the new
version of the article of the European Union Treaty).
The provisions concerning the institution of closer co-operation
stress that their application in practice is possible when at least a majority
of the member states are involved. Such co-operation shall remain open to
all member states. However, despite all its additional conditions, the
essential character of the institution remains unchanged. A provision has
been made that enables an efficient functioning of the Union within a
specific group of member states, e.g., among the countries participating in
the single currency, or among the “old” members, without the need for an
involvement of all the member states.
The decision made at the Luxembourg Summit to start the
negotiations with six countries is a logical consequence of the change
occurring in the integration processes. A further deepening of the
integration of the fifteen countries, and twenty-one after the enlargement,
has become impossible at the current stage. In fact, the concept of Europe
formulated in the famous Shauble-Lamers document put forward by the
leading CDU politicians, and the concept promoted by Giscard d’Estaing
have won. Both of them, with minor differences, envisage the
establishment of a solid nucleus of the Union, whose political system
should acquire the character of a federate structure through the deepening
of internal integration. Giscard d’Estaing would see such a nucleus
consisting of only five countries: France, Germany, and the Benelux
countries. They would constitute the first ring, the European power. The
second ring would be made of countries which, with the help of the solid
nucleus, should be included in the European power; while the countries
aspiring to the EU membership would be given a place in the European
area, exclusively in the free trade zone. During various seminars and
discussions held in Poland, the enlargement has been pegged, among
other factors, to the success of the third integration stage, i.e., the
monetary union. However, no one has paid attention to the fact that
the character of that condition is negative. The establishment of the
common currency will mean the formation of a solid nucleus of the
Union. Its establishment will enable the enlargement and the
placement of new member states in the European area. One may put
forward the hypothesis that the common currency and the institution
of closer co-operation, enable the enlargement and provide a real
chance for its implementation. The Union may deepen its internal
integration, while leaving our countries in the margin of the process.
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II.  Strategic goals of the Polish negotiating mandate
Goal one: negotiating realistic, optimum and effective transition
periods for Poland on the basis of accurate economic calculations.
Unjustified extension of the transition periods would be a historic neglect
and short-sighted ignorance.
One may wonder about the attitude which Poland should adopt in
case of a long-term change in the pace of the integration. First of all, the
assumption should be made that the option of a strongly integrated EU
which would be efficient in the implementation of its decisions, is
definitely more advantageous for Poland. Only such a Union may play a
major role in stimulating efficient reforms in the Polish economy. Only a
strong Union may be capable of defending European interests in
international economic and political relations. However, bearing in mind
the above observations, it would be difficult not to take into account the
“negative” scenario for the development of European integration. If that
scenario is realised, the accession of new members, including Poland, will
certainly be easier than it would be if the Union pursued the deeper,
federate integration model. The accession will be limited to the adoption of
the requirements of the Single Market, without a need to transfer some of
the national powers in the area of the foreign and security policy, as well
as the judiciary, to the supra-national level. There will be a high
probability for an easier achievement of longer transition periods and
derogation from the enforcement of particular areas of the acquis
communautaire. There are grounds to fear that, under the influence of
strong industrial and agricultural lobbies, Polish negotiators might be
trapped into those seemingly easier agreements. However, for the sake of
the Polish economic interests, the transition periods should be as short as
possible, and based on detailed calculations of their effectiveness. The
temptation to extend transition periods longer than it is really
necessary, constitutes the greatest threat to Poland’s economic and
civilisation development. According to its own wishes, the country
might be placed in the Union’s last ring, together with the countries
whose economic reforms are less advanced compared to Poland at the
moment. One must not let the Polish Euro-sceptics identify tough
negotiations with a firm defence of Poland’s place in Europe’s second
division. This may be the case if we are stubborn in seeking to
negotiate as long transition periods as possible. Then, even if the
Union strongly resisted such an arrangement, there will be a chance
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for us to be placed in its third division. Tough negotiations are
negotiations leading to the quick achievement of a full membership.
They imply the assumption of all the obligation, and the ability to fully
take advantage of the status of an equal member of the organisation.
The Polish media have recently made a fetish of the position of
negotiator in the accession talks. Due to a prolonged period of waiting
before the appointment, an impression was given of the omnipotence of
the person holding the post. In fact, even with the best negotiator, there are
no chances for success unless the individual line ministers understand the
strategic goals of the negotiations, unless particular interests are rejected,
and a general consensus is reached. Without that, regardless of the efforts
made by the negotiating team, Poland will not become a member of the
European Union, but of the European economic area.
Goal two: joining the EU as part of the first enlargement wave,
along with the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The belief that it is not possible for the Czech Republic or Hungary
to join the Union earlier than Poland liners on among the Polish public,
but also among some of the political circles in Poland.
There is a real threat of the negotiations being prolonged, and
Poland achieving the membership later than the remaining candidate
countries. Poland is the largest among the six selected countries. The
population of Cyprus, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia
amounts to a total of 25 million, which makes barely two-thirds compared
to the population of Poland. One may say that small countries pose small
problems. However, when comparing the size of Poland’s negotiation
problems, the scope of the necessary adjustment and economic reforms
with the economy of Cyprus or Slovenia, one may observe that the right
frame of reference may only be obtained by looking at the negotiation
problems of all the countries combined. The belief that it is not possible,
for example, for the Czech Republic of Hungary, to join the Union earlier
than Poland lingers on among the Polish public, but also among some of
the political circles in Poland. It is difficult to explain in a rational way the
grounds on which that opinion is based. It might have been justified to a
certain extent during the times when efforts were made to join NATO. In a
situation when Poland’s membership in NATO is basically settled, the
accession to the Union will be determined to a large extent by economic
factors and the overall balance of costs.
According to the Amsterdam Treaty, “At least one year before the
expansion of the Union beyond twenty members, a conference of
17
government representatives will be held to review all the treaty provisions
concerning the composition and functioning of institutions.” Thus, the
Union’s most difficult problem, the reform of institutions, has been
postponed until the negotiations which are to begin at the time when
the twenty-first country will be joining the Union. Six countries
started the negotiations in March 1998. The accession of only five of
them will not make it necessary to convene a new inter-government
conference. In fact, no one is interested in holding the conference,
fearing that it might spur a wave of contradictory interests among the
member states. If the Union is enlarged to include only five more
countries, every member state will be represented by one member in the
European Commission. The Commission is currently comprised of twenty
members. Five large member states nominate two members each, while ten
smaller ones one member each. Thus, in the case of accession of five new
members, the large countries would give up their double representation on
the Commission. A proposal to change the system of voting has been put
forward as a compensation for those countries. The change is to be
acceptable to all the member states (d’une maniere acceptable pout tous
les etats membres). Having come to terms with the lack of precision in the
above statement, one may say that, for the time being, the Union is
prepared for the accession of only five countries. Meanwhile, it is to be
enlarged by six countries, but no arrangements have been made for that
option.
The negotiations with Poland will certainly be the most difficult. If a
decision is made to accept all the six countries simultaneously, the
remaining five countries would most likely have to wait for Poland.
However, another scenario is also possible, for example four plus two,
with the first group comprised of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia
and Slovenia, and the second one including Poland and Cyprus (the latter,
for example, due to the unresolved issue of the division of the island). An
option five plus one is also possible. It should be stated clearly that any
scenario making it impossible for Poland to join the EU as part of the first
enlargement wave is very disadvantageous. It would delay our
membership and peg it to the results of the inter-government conference
provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty and to the reform of the Union’s
institutions.
Goal three: Taking political and economic advantage of Poland’s
geographical situation.
There is no doubt that Poland will be very isolated in promoting its
eastern neighbours.
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Despite the fact that the negotiations with Poland will be of a
primarily economic character, one must not forget about political aspects.
Over the centuries, Poland generated the political situation in the Central
Eastern European arena. By forming the union with Lithuania, it
established the first federate state in the history of modern-age Europe.
Two religions: the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches, and two cultures:
the western and the eastern culture coexisted in that state. Over the
centuries, Poland played a positive role as a universal liaison between the
Slavic world and the western world. Although the country made a number
of historical mistakes while performing that function, one should not be
surprised that it is natural for those nations to turn their eyes to Poland
after they liberated themselves from the Soviet domination. For Lithuania
or Ukraine, for example, the choice between Russia and the West is
now, at least in the nearest perspective, in a way, a choice between
Russia and Poland. In addition, the political circles in those countries are
very impressed with the success of the Polish economic reforms achieved
thanks to the Balcerowicz plan. However, all that does not mean an
automatic rapprochement between those countries and Poland. Their
people still feel the reluctance resulting from the old hurts and fears of the
philosophy of Poland as a power. The fear and passive resistance towards
dramatic reforms and any changes which the reforms would bring, are
even more important. It would be better for Poland and for Europe if
NATO and the European Union did not end on the Bug River. However,
for the time being, that proposal is received with great reservations by the
EU political circles. There is no doubt either that we will be very
isolated in promoting our eastern neighbours. Never in their history
have the Czechs and Hungarians played the role of liaisons between the
East and the West. These nations were comprised within the Austria-
Hungary Empire under the House of Habsburg. They have always been
connected with the West and did not impact on the developments in the
region. The need to promote an eastern policy in the West may become
our advantage. After all, it adds to the list of economic arguments a vital
argument of a geopolitical character, i.e., our friendly policy towards the
eastern neighbours, as well as border relations and national minority issues
regulated by treaties. All these factors foster the idea of a safer Europe
which would not be divided into new areas of influence.
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Goal four: Guaranteeing to Polish citizens full rights resulting from
the membership in the European Union.
If the negotiations were restricted to the issues related to the Single
Market alone, that would mean consent to Poland being pushed off to the
outskirts of the European economic area.
Beginning from the Treaty of Rome until 1992, the Single Market
has been the driving force of European integration. Together with its
completion, further integration processes will naturally proceed within the
second and the third pillars. The implementation of a common foreign and
security policy, if ever realised, will be the last stage of the unification of
Europe due to the need to reduce dramatically the sovereignty of
individual states. One may project that, during the coming decade, the
integration will be effectuated within the third pillar, i.e., in the area of the
judiciary and law enforcement. Issues related to the third pillar constitute
the largest part of the Amsterdam Treaty. It should be expected that they
will also dominate in EU legislation.
It is characteristic that the Union’s policy towards the candidate
countries to date has basically been centred exclusively around the
issues related to the Single Market, while hardly mentioning the third
pillar. Thus, the candidate countries are being pushed off to the third
ring of the Union, the European area. It is very likely that that the EU
negotiating mandate will contain a clause about negotiating the longest
possible transition period for Poland with regard to the free flow of people.
That free flow of people only appears to be connected with the Single
Market, while being very strongly related to the third pillar. It will be easy
for EU politicians to argue about the need to restrict that freedom in the
case of Poland on the grounds of unemployment, the fear of organised
crime, insufficiently tight controls on Poland’s eastern borders, etc. In
exchange for consent not to let Poland enjoy the fourth freedom, the
negotiators will gladly agree to our proposals concerning extended
transition periods for agriculture or the steel industry. If we accept that
deal, we will fall into the trap of being placed in the third ring from
which it will be very difficult to get out. One should not forget that the
integration of the member states within the third pillar will be pursued on
the basis of a negative approach, the fear of illegal immigration, threats to
the feeling of security, etc., backed by strong public support. It would be
very convenient for the Union to keep its checks at the border with Poland
for a long time still. There is no doubt that the Union will be trying to
achieve that. There is a very real danger that a kind of feedback will
appear. Poland will be trying to negotiate the longest protection periods for
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its industry and agriculture, while the Union will be able to maintain its
checks at the border in a natural way, without a need to put a particular
effort into the relevant negotiations.
Poland’s membership in the European Union is a great challenge for
the entire nation. But it is a pity that the membership is often presented to
the public exclusively in terms of its economic aspect. This gives an
impression that our accession to the EU is a result of purely cynical
calculations, i.e., the economic advantages. This is very dangerous. It is
boring to keep repeating the cliché that the membership means rights and
obligations. It means the adoption of shared principles and values, respect
for law, democracy, civil rights and freedoms. It means solidarity among
the nations, tolerance, individual freedoms and civil ties in the broad sense
of the terms. It means the feeling of responsibility for the future of Europe,
and thus, the feeling of European identity. If we want to participate in the
building of Europe, already now, we must identify ourselves with its
traditional principles, and treat the economy only as one of the elements of
the structure.
The Polish negotiations should focus on defending full rights
resulting from the EU citizenship. Any consent to give up on those
rights, to trade them for longer protection periods for the Polish steel
or coal industries, will be at odds with the understanding of a civil
state. It must not turn out again that abstract collective interests
urged by lobbies are more important than the rights of an individual.
The achievement of a second class citizenship for Poles will imply a
silent approval to the European idea being soon resented by the
people. After all, it is better to be poor but equal in one’s own country
than richer but worse where they do not want us. It is fundamental
for our negotiators to understand the importance of the adoption of
full rights and duties for our citizens, which include holding the
European passports. Without that fundamental element, even the best
results of our economy will not be enough. After all, the importance of
a country and its rank in the world today are measured directly by
the approach of the state towards its own citizens.
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Supplement
Acquis communautaire: scarring the officials
The adjustment of Polish legislation to EU standards is
implemented mainly through the passing of new legislative acts or via
amendments introduced to existing legislation. On the other hand, the
harmonisation is pursued in a very small extend via pro-European
interpretation of existing legislation. The reports presented  by the Polish
government on the progress of harmonisation of law with Community
legislation describe the changes made in Polish legislation, the number of
newly introduced acts, but they do not contain any information about the
legal practice in court or out of court, i.e., the institutional enforcement
of legislation. However, it is not enough just to state that the texts of new
legislative acts comply with European legislation. Such compliance does
not have to mean the achievement of real harmonisation at all.
Recommendations for the harmonisation efforts
1.  The legislative procedure in the European Union is clearly based on
negotiations. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage of the
system. An advantage, because the legislative acts adopted this way are
backed by the will and agreed position of the fifteen member states, the
European Parliament, and the relevant advisory bodies such as the
Social Economic Committee or the Regions Committee. On the other
hand, the weakness of the system is related to deficiencies of laws made
that way. Every compromise requires a part of the proposed provisions
and legislative measures to be given up. Quite frequently, lawyers
accustomed to the traditional, continental legislative procedure, find it
difficult to accept the results of the compromise. The law makers
realise the poor quality of the Community legislation. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the issue has been raised during the last Inter-
Government Conference which ended in Amsterdam in July 1997. The
declaration accompanying the Amsterdam Treaty stressed that the
quality of legislation was a fundamental prerequisite for a proper
perception of legislation in the member states. The declaration appealed
to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission to pass
guidelines (lignes directives) which would determine the rules
concerning the formulation of legislative acts, with the aim of enabling a
better understanding of legislation by the entities to which it is
addressed.
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2.  Poland, and its state administration in particular, extol the quality and
integrity of Community legislation. The statement that something is
provided for by Community legislation is often used as the final
argument in discussions. However, one should not forget that, when
making their legislation, the Union’s institutions are subject to diverse
influence. They are not only under the pressure of the member states,
but they are also exposed to lobbying by various groups of interest
represented in Brussels. It is typical that the legislation passed this way
often does not enjoy support in the member states, and the Commission
must resort to using legal measures to ensure its enforcement. The
White Paper presented to Poland on “The Preparation of the Associated
Central Eastern European Countries for Integration with the Internal
Market of the European Union” lists Community legislation to which
Poland should adjust. However, the point is that many directives
referred to in the White Paper have not been complied with yet by
the member states. We should certainly take this aspect into account
during the upcoming negotiations.
3.  Democracy lays the foundations of the legislative system based on
negotiations. The more the state is decentralised, the closer it is to the
citizens, the greater their participation is in the law making process. The
principle of subsidiarity upheld in the Union, empowers the Union to
take action only when, and only to the extent in which the objectives of
the proposed activities cannot be achieved sufficiently by the member
states (Art. 3b of the Maastricht Treaty). According to the principle of
subsidiarity, the Union has the right to act instead of the member states
only when its actions turn out to be more efficient in the process of
objective implementation (efficiency by better results). In the positive
sense, this implies that the primary competence rests with the member
states, and the Council of the European Union should determine in all
cases whether or not there is a need to apply Art. 3 of the Treaty. The
principle of subsidiarity has been introduced into the preamble of the
Constitution as one of the principles underlying the new system of the
Polish state. The Constitution is provided for as the organic law of the
state, based on the respect for freedom, justice, cooperation among
authorities, social dialogue, and on the principle of subsidiarity
reinforcing the rights of citizens and their communities. The practical
enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity on a larger scale in
Poland should be enabled by the administrative reform. The greater
the competence transferred to the local governments, the more
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democratic shall the law be, and thereby, the closer shall it become to
the citizens.
4.  The weakness of the legislative system is the difficulty in differentiating
between the basic regulations and the implementing regulations. Within
the system of Community legislation, there is no hierarchy of
importance of particular legislative acts, unlike in the national legislation
of the continental European countries. In Community legislation, both
regulations and directives often stipulate specific ensuing provisions to
be developed, which are subsequently passed as regulations or
directives. In addition to the range of legislative acts provided for in the
treaties, the Communities issue a number of different legislative
measures whose legal consequences depend on their content. These
legislative acts bear various names, such as: programmes, projects,
memoranda, recommendations, declarations, joint resolutions,
proclamations, joint positions, etc. That practice further obscures the
system and hierarchy of Community law, which tend to lack
transparency anyway. The introduction of the chapter on transparency
into the treaty is mainly meant to bring the activities of Community
institutions closer to the citizens. Under the new Art. A, all EU
citizens, as well as all individuals and entities which have their
domicile or seat on the Union’s territory, have the right to be
provided access to the documentation of the European Parliament,
the Council and the Commission. The procedures concerning the
access to documentation shall be laid out by the Council within two
years after the treaty takes effect. All Community institutions shall
establish internal rules of procedure to determine the rules governing the
access to their documentation.
5.  The institutional weakness of the legislative process is related to the fact
that the role of the European Parliament is not sufficiently large still.
However, it does not appear likely that the system vesting decision
making powers in the Council and in the member states will be
abandoned in the nearest future. Therefore, it seems that the law
making process in the Union will continue to be of an inter-
government and not international character for a long time still.
The nature of the Union prescribes its functioning to rely on cooperation
among the member states, and on continuous efforts to seek
compromise between diverse interests. This leads to a growing
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alienation of the citizens because all the major structural changes are
enforced via the EU executive authorities, without the participation of
national parliaments and the European Parliament. The involvement of
representative institutions is limited to pronouncing their opinion for or
against. The parliaments are faced with accomplished facts, and have no
impact on substantial discussions and negotiations. Thus, the traditional
roles of the legislative and the executive branches of the government are
swapped.
Recommendations useful for the negotiations
1. The basic precondition for Poland’s accession to the European Union, is
the adoption of the entire EU legislation by the country. In this context,
one should not forget that the main challenge is posed not by the technical
adjustment of the texts of law itself. It is necessary to establish an
economic, administrative and social system to support and monitor the
enforcement of the legislation. Therefore, together with the process of
harmonisation of Polish legislation, parallel efforts should be undertaken to
create an overall institutional system.
One may wonder about the effect of recognising the prevailing
power of EU legislation and its direct implementation on the Polish
legislature and judiciary.
Firstly, having joined the European Union, in case of interpretation
or implementation problems concerning Community legislation, Poland
will be required to apply no other procedure than that provided for in EU
legislation (Art. 219 of the EU Treaty). This means that conflicts between
Poland and any other EU member state shall be settled exclusively in
court, and the only court empowered to resolve such conflicts shall be the
European Court of Justice.
Secondly, as provided for in Art. 169 of the EU Treaty, the
European Commission will be able to move against Poland if the country
failed to fulfil its obligations assumed under the Treaty. As a consequence,
Poland will also be able to move to the European Court of Justice against
another member state (Art. 170 of the EU Treaty) on grounds of that state
failing to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, or against the European
Commission or the Council, if they defy the Treaty by failing to make
decisions (Art. 175 of the EU Treaty).
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Thirdly, all Polish citizens and entities will be able to file for
proceedings against decisions made by EU institutions, if a given
decision concerns them directly and specifically (Art. 173.4).
Fourthly, as a member state, Poland will be able to move to the
European Court of Justice to request the Court to examine the legality of
legislative acts made by Community authorities (Art. 173 of the EU
Treaty).
2. The harmonisation of law implies certain costs. These are the costs
related to the reforms of the entire Polish economy. It is trivial to say that a
simple transfer of EU legislation, without adjusting to its economic
provisions, would ruin completely Poland’s chances for real integration
with the European Union. Legislative measures were passed in abundance
in Poland in the past, but they were not accompanied by the relevant
economic measures. One should bear that in mind in order not to fall again
into the trap of making laws that exist on paper alone. Already now,
having analysed the extent of adjustment measures, it is possible to
determine the desirable time limits for their completion. As regards the
legislative acts which Poland will be required to adopt by the time of
accession, this will be five to six years (under the assumption that the
negotiations will take three to four years plus two years for their
ratification).
3. In the formal sense, the obligation to adjust Polish legislation to
accommodate the tasks related to the country’s future membership of the
European Union is a consequence of Art. 68 and 69 of the Europe
Agreement concluded between Poland and the European Communities and
their member states. The above provisions lay out the guidelines
concerning the character of the adjustment process, as well as the priority
areas. After its ratification, the Europe Agreement became a part of
legislation of the two signatories. According to the rule pacta sunt
servanda, the provisions of the Agreement are binding for the Polish state,
the Communities, and the member states. The Europe Agreement does not
compel Poland to adopt Community legislation literally. Articles 68 and 69
use the term “harmonisation of legal regulations.” This means the
achievement of a degree of law adjustment, in which legislation would be
able to fulfil the tasks laid out in the Agreement.
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Compared to the obligations of the member states, the Europe
Agreement guarantees for Poland a much greater autonomy with regard to
law adjustment. Until Poland joins the Union, Community legislation
will continue to be a model for us, but not a source of law. We should
harmonise our legislation in line with that model. The Europe Agreement
does not determine a specific deadline for our adjustment efforts to be
completed. One of the reasons why it would be difficult to set such a
deadline is that law harmonisation must be a process of a dynamic
character. It is necessary to adjust to the existing legislation and to the new
acts which are made every year. Nonetheless, in some cases, the Europe
Agreement lays out quite a precise timetable for the adjustment efforts.
This refers, for example, to the adjustment of the customs law, the opening
of the Polish market, investment, the supply of services, and the assistance
provided by the state.
4. The adjustment of Polish legislation to EU standards is achieved mainly
via creation of new legislative acts or through amendments made to the
already existing ones. On the other hand, only to a very small extent is the
harmonisation sought by means of pro-European interpretation of existing
legislation. Having compared legislative acts passed in the European
Union and in Poland, one is struck by a lack of precise and, at the
same time, comprehensible justification of the purpose meant to be
achieved through the Polish legislative measures. As a rule, the
justification is the most elaborate part of the Union’s legislative acts. This
is very important from the educational point of view. At the same time, the
relevant requirement safeguards the law makers against excessive
casuistry. Poland has a bad tradition of identifying law exclusively with the
text of the regulations, while overestimating the importance of tangible
measures. However, the acts which are made, constitute only one element,
albeit the basic one, of the substance of law. This approach has been
described by professor Ewa Ł towska as text-centred. It focuses on the
text of legislation, without analysing the institutional and functional
aspects of its existence. The reports presented by the Polish government
on the progress of work on law harmonisation with European legislation
describe, for example, the changes made in legislation, the number of new
acts passed, but they provide no information about the court or out-of-
court practice, i.e., the general institutional framework of law enforcement.
Meanwhile, it is not enough to state that the text of new legislation
complies with European legislation. Such compliance does not have to
mean at all that the harmonisation has been achieved. In European
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legislation, the text of a legislative act is very often restricted to
determining either the desirable results, while leaving the means and
methods of implementation up to national legislatures, or to delimiting
particular provisions by ordering or banning a certain type of behaviour.
Further specification of that behaviour is left to the legal practice and court
jurisdiction. Without going into the details of the very interesting issue of
the European law standards, one should note the extremely important role
of the European Court of Justice in the reinforcement of those standards in
the entire Union. Under Art. 177 of the European Community Treaty, y the
power of preliminary rulings, the Court of Justice settles issues related to
the interpretation of treaty provisions and the validity of secondary
legislation. Already now, when possible, Polish courts should consult the
judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice to a greater extent,
thereby providing pro-European interpretation of Polish legislation. This
should apply predominantly to those areas in which the law of the land has
already been harmonised with Community legislation. In a number of
cases, pro-European interpretation of law provided by Polish courts
may replace the need to pass new legislative acts, thus making it
possible to abandon the criticised text-centred approach. Unfortunately,
that method of law harmonisation has been used to a very small degree to
date.
Polish negligence: lobbying in the EU
At the moment, both in Poland and in the EU, work is underway on
determining the negotiating mandates. In the Union, specific terms of the
mandate concerning economic issues will be consulted over with the
Social Economic Committee. Therefore, powerful lobbying organisations
representing the interests of EU agriculture, industry and trade will make
an impact on the final shape of these points. Among more than one
hundred European industry federations, one may find, for example, the
CIAA (the confederation of the food and agriculture industry),
COPA/COGECA (agricultural producers), ESTA (the tobacco industry),
EUROFER, EUROMETAUX (steel industries), EUROGAS (natural gas
suppliers), EFPIA (pharmaceuticals), ACEA (the automotive industry),
etc.
It should be stressed that the complexity of the structures and
decision making procedures in the European Communities, and most of all,
the importance and significance of those decisions, have encouraged the
establishment of lobbying organisations and group pressures. Few people
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in Poland realise that Community legislation accounts for over 80% of
economic legislation binding in the member states, and on the
average, a half of legislative acts in the member states originate from
earlier decisions made by Community institutions. Since the mid-
1980s, the Communities have been passing several thousand various
legislative acts per year. The EU Council alone passes on the average 300-
400 regulations per year, not to mention other acts such as directives or
decisions. Legislative acts adopted by the Community are binding in whole
and applied directly in all the member states without the need to ratify or
endorse them. The direct application of Community legislation means that
its provisions have full binding power, the same in all the member states,
starting from the moment of taking effect, throughout the entire period of
validity. Those directly binding regulations constitute the source of law
and obligations to all those whom they concern, regardless of whether this
applies to the member states, individuals, or entities. That effectiveness
also applies to all courts whose judiciary function in the member states is
to safeguard the rights guaranteed to individuals by Community legislation.
Since Community legislation is directly applied and effective, and
most of the economic decisions are made by the Council of Ministers of
the European Union of by the European Commission, it is not surprising
that the number of lobbying organisations functioning in Brussels is
currently estimated at over 4,000.
The 1985 was a breakthrough year in the activities of European
lobbyists, when the European Commission announced the White Paper
concerning the Single Market by 1992. The number of lobbying groups in
Brussels doubled at that time.
There is a wide range of lobbying organisations. These include both
the influential federations of particular industries affiliated to UNICE (the
Union of European Industry Confederations and Employers), and
representatives of trade unions, consumers, or conservationist
organisations. A separate category is comprised of representatives of
regions, whose role has increased since the establishment of the Regions
Committee after the Maastricht Treaty took effect. German and Austrian
laender, Spanish comunides, as well as regions from countries which do
not have a federate structure, e.g., Bretagne or Northern Ireland, have their
representative and liaison offices in Brussels.
The importance of lobbying may also be proved by the fact that
institutions training professional lobbyists have been established in
Brussels. The European Institute for Public Affairs and Lobbying was
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established in 1994, and the European Centre for Public Affairs in
Brussels in 1996.
The Polish representation in Brussels is comprised of the diplomatic
posts of the Polish government (the Embassy in Belgium, the Mission at
the EU, the Trade Counsellor’s Office), and several companies with a
Polish share focusing mainly on the local market (Benelux). No
organisation of a strictly lobbying character to represent Polish companies
has been established in Brussels to date.
Polish diplomatic posts deal in political lobbying which includes
contacts at the highest level of EU diplomacy and administration. These
contacts concern economic issues to a large extent, but the point is mainly
to settle economic issues concerning the country as a whole, and not to
represent the interests of individual companies. Polish diplomats from the
Mission to the European Union sometimes intervene on behalf of
individual cases, but only upon clear instructions to do so from their
headquarters. On the other hand, the trade counsellors’ offices deal in
direct promotion of Polish companies. However, for the past several years,
the activities of the offices have been diminished, the offices have been
described as relics of a centrally planned economy, and their very right to
exist has been undermined. That uncertainty impacts on the day-to-day
work of the offices, while a lack of definite decisions leads to
shortcomings in investment and staff. In addition, one must not forget that
the offices are government agencies financed from the state budget. They
represent mainly long term economic interests of the state, which, in
specific cases, may not always be identical with the interests of individual
companies.
In the European Parliament, apart from the standing Joint
Parliamentary Committee of the Republic of Poland and the European
Union, comprised deputies to the European Parliament, and members of
the Polish Sejm and Senate in equal numbers, there is also the Group of
Poland’s Friends Amici Poloniae. The Group was established in 1982,
after martial law was imposed in Poland. It is estimated that, thanks to the
Group, Poland was provided aid worth 140 million ECU. It should be
stressed that Amici Poloniae is basically the only non-government
lobbying organisation which operates within EU institutions and promotes
Polish interests.
Apart from the aforementioned activities and institutions which, in
addition to their primary functions, may lobby on behalf of individual
Polish companies or capital groups, there is not a single lobbying
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organisation of the Polish industry in Brussels. The first attempt to set up
such an organisation was the one-man representative of the Polish
Chamber of Commerce (KIG) which functioned in 1994-1996. It could not
develop large-scale activities due to a shortage of financial resources and a
lack of a uniform structure to represent the interests of the Polish business
both in Poland and abroad.
The Confederation of Polish Employers has formally been accepted
as a member of UNICE. However, it does not have a permanent
representative at UNICE, which is a precondition for efficient participation
in the organisation’s work. UNICE is a very influential organisation in the
European Union. It groups national confederations of employers, indirectly
representing the unions (chambers) of particular national industries
affiliated to the confederations, as well as their European representations.
In 1997, on the initiative of the European Integration Committee, a
Polish liaison group was set up to establish cooperation with the Social
Economic Committee of the European Union. The group is comprised of
representatives of various employers organisations, business circles, trade
unions, and organisations representing diverse groups of interest. Members
of the group include, among others, representatives of: the Polish Business
Board (PRB), the Confederation of Polish Employers (KPP), the Polish
Chamber of Commerce, Solidarity, a consumer organisation. As stipulated
in the National Integration Strategy and in the report presented by the
secretary of the European Integration Committee on the preparations for
negotiations with the EU, the group comprised of representatives of these
organisations constitutes the forum for consultations over the preparations
for the talks. In the future, this is to hold for the negotiations as well. “The
goal of advanced consultations with representatives of business circles,
industry and trade chambers, consumer and employers organisations, is to
make these organisations involved in the work on the Polish negotiating
mandate, and in preparing Polish companies to function in the Single
Market. Within this framework, certain working groups have already
decided to establish the so called partner groups to organise meetings
between working groups and all the business, social and trade
organisations which indicate their interest in participating in the process.”
At this point, it is difficult to evaluate the real value of the liaison
group initiative. The words assuring about the group’s involvement in the
work on the Polish negotiating mandate, may be a promise that its opinion
will be taken into account in the future. The quality of that opinion will
depend on access to information, sound knowledge of the practical side of
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the negotiations, the stamina of individual people, and the rank of
organisations represented in the group. Shortcomings in any of these areas,
and a lack of access to information in particular, may restrict the
significance of the establishment of the group to a formal fulfilment of the
point 8.17 of the National Integration Strategy. The point referred to
stipulates that the government shall provide support for the initiative aimed
at the establishment of a permanent cooperation mechanism with non-
government organisations, including consultations during preparations for
the negotiations and during the negotiations. Later on in the same point,
the document stressed the importance of external activities and the need to
set up a system to lobby on behalf of Polish economic and political
interests in EU institutions and organisations. The system has not been
established to date. The lack of the system cannot be blamed on
insufficient activities on the part of the government. The government
cannot be expected to organise the activities of independent companies or
capital groups and to act instead of them to safeguard their interests, as it
used to be the case in the past. These groups should establish a strong,
independent lobbying organisation in Brussels on their own initiative.
The point in having an independent representation of Polish
economic interests in Brussels should be evaluated in terms of the
advantages of its establishment. Such an evaluation is difficult because the
nature of lobbying does not involve direct profits. The profits are indirect,
originating, e.g., from the achievement legal regulations advantageous for
the capital group, higher duties on products supplied by competition, the
achievement of advantageous licences, etc. Having assumed that lobbying
is effective, one may also estimate the losses incurred due to its absence.
The results of such calculations will always be hypothetical. Lobbyists can
never be one-hundred percent sure that their efforts will produce specific
gains. An example may be provided by profits forfeited by Polish
companies due to anti-dumping restrictions imposed by the EU. The total
losses run in tens of millions of dollars. It is highly probable that these
losses could have been avoided if lobbying were undertaken in due time.
Under the currently binding regulations, motions filing for anti-dumping
proceedings to be instituted are filed by European industry federations
directly affected by dumping. These federations are affiliated to UNICE
through their national confederations of industry and employers. The
Polish presence in Brussels, active participation in the work of UNICE,
and most of all, direct contacts with the plaintiff federations before the
motions were filed or in the course of the explanatory proceedings, would
have made it possible to resolve the conflict situations in mutual
arrangements in a number of cases.
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Another example of potential losses is the absence of Polish
companies in tenders announced by the European Commission. Under Art.
67.2 of the Europe Agreement, Polish enterprises were made eligible to
take part in tenders held on the territory of the Communities, starting from
the day when the Agreement became effective. In line with the principle of
asymmetry adopted in the Agreement, EU companies will be able to take
part in tenders in Poland no later than by the conclusion of the first
transition period (five years from the date when the Agreement takes
effect). To date, Polish companies have not been submitting their offers in
the public tendering procedures in the EU market. The lack of activity in
that field is a result of various factors. One of them is certainly the need for
an involvement of significant financial resources as a precondition for the
participation in tenders. However, most often, the companies do not have
the necessary information about the tendering procedure. If a
representation of the Polish industry were established in Brussels, one of
its tasks would be to gather information about the tenders announced and
to evaluate the potential changes of Polish companies if they submitted
their bids.
It is worrying that, for various reasons, Polish producers and
exporters have wound up a large number of representative offices abroad.
These included representative offices in Brussels. In Warsaw, the opposite
process has been observed. The number of foreign consulting or law firms
establishing their offices in Warsaw is impressive. It is trivial to stress that
access to information is a prerequisite for efficiency in any field.
A typical task of all lobbyists in Brussels is to analyse Community
legislation on a current basis, and to make efforts to impact on the
regulations at the initial stage of the decision shaping process. In the case
of a representation of the Polish industry, its activities in this area should
lead to the establishment of an early warning system which would enable
the represented entities to formulate their position on EU legislative acts
vital from their point of view early enough. In order to be able to fulfil that
task, the representative office should be provided with an on-line access to
the APC system (monitoring of the European Commission’s proposals
concerning legislative changes), ABEL and CELEX systems (containing
the documents published in Official Journal series L and C), to the whole
of Community legislation, as well as to the RAPID and EPOQUE systems
(quick access to the current documents of the Commission and the
Council, as well as all documents and legislative procedures in the
European Parliament). It is also necessary to carry out day-to-day analysis
of particular EU markets (the steel market, the produce market, the textiles
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market, the automotive market, energy, transport), as well as to prepare
more general reports about the economic and political situation in the EU.
The representative office should follow closely the European policy
towards competition (the main partner in that case is the Commissions
Directoriate General IV), and in particular, anti-trust proceedings enforced
by the Commission, and company mergers monitored by the Commission.
It should monitor the EU financial market, examining the opportunities for
Polish companies to obtain advantageous loans from European financial
institutions (the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development). Finally, last but not least, it should
provide active support for the Polish negotiating teams by presenting them
with the opinion of Polish and EU capital groups concerning specific
negotiation topics.
It is necessary to use efficiently the time which is running short until
Poland’s accession to the European Union. Polish companies should play
an important role in adjusting the Polish economy to the requirements of
the Common Market, the free flow of goods, services, capital, and labour.
The establishment of a representation of the Polish industry in Brussels
will enable direct and permanent contacts with similar European
organisations which will have a significant influence on determining the
terms of accession talks in particular topical groups. The decision to
establish the representation in Brussels should be made right away because
the number of lobbying organisations will grow dramatically after the EU
enlargement.
